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Abstract
We develop and estimate a structural model that incorporates a sizable public sector in a
labor market with search frictions. The wage distribution and the employment rate in the public
sector are taken as exogenous policy parameters. Overall wage distribution and employment rate
are determined within the model, taking into account the private sector's endogenous response
to public sector employment policies. Job turnover is sector specic and transitions between
sectors depend on the worker's decision to accept alternative employment in the same or dierent
sector by comparing the value of employment in the current and prospective jobs. The model is
estimated on British data by a method of moments. We use the model to simulate the impact
of various counterfactual public sector wage and employment policies.
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1 Introduction
We formulate a search-theoretic model to explore the impact of public sector wage and hiring
policies on labor market performance. The wage oer distribution and job oer rate of the public
sector are treated as exogenous policy parameters, and conditional on these, the private sector
wage distribution, hiring intensity, and productivity distribution are then derived endogenously.
Exploiting data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) the model is then estimated by
minimum-distance matching of some key moments from the data. These estimates allow us to make
counterfactual policy analysis of dierent public sector wage policies. We thus propose a structural
modeling tool for the ex-ante assessment of public sector wage and hiring policies.
There has been very little done in modeling the public sector explicitly within an equilibrium
model of the labor market and nothing to our knowledge that estimates such a model. This is a
major oversight when one thinks that in our data 24% of employed individuals were employed by
the public sector.1 It is, of course, naive to believe that with an employment share this large the
public sector will not inuence wage determination and by extension overall employment.
Instead of modeling the behavior of private sector rms explicitly, the literature thus far has
been dominated by reduced form comparisons of the two sectors.2 The general consensus emerging
from the empirical literature is that the public sector wage distribution is more compressed than
that in the private sector and workers receive a small public sector wage premium which is more
prevalent in low-skilled workers.
With these stylized facts being known for some time, it is fairly surprising that so little has been
done in explicitly modeling the interaction between the two sectors. The existing literature that
does this has largely focused on assessing the impact of the public sector on the level or volatility
of aggregate wages and employment. Papers in that vein include Algan et al. (2002), Quadrini
and Trigari (2007), Horner et al. (2007), and Gomes (2014). All model search as directed to a
particular sector and none has direct job-to-job reallocation (within or between sectors). All model
1Algan et al. (2002) report that, based on a slightly narrower denition of public sector employment, the OECD
nds an average public sector share of total employment of 18.8% in 2000 over a sample of 17 major OECD countries.
2For a survey of the literature, see Bender (1998). The literature on the specic topic of scal austerity and public
sector pay and employment in the UK is still very limited at the time of writing. The Institute for Fiscal Studies has
comprehensive descriptive work on the subject (Cribb et al., 2014) and is actively conducting further research.
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wages as determined by bargaining over the surplus from a match. Algan et al. (2002) nd that
the creation of public sector jobs has a massive crowding out eect on private-sector job creation,
such that the marginal public sector job may destroy as many as 1.5 private sector jobs in some
OECD countries. This crowding out eect is especially strong when public sector wages are high
and/or when public and private-sector output are close substitutes. Focusing on the cyclicality of
employment, Quadrini and Trigari (2007) examine a public sector wage policy that is acyclical (a
single wage) and procyclical (government wage is an increasing function of private sector wages).
Calibrating the model for the US economy, they nd that public sector employment and wage
policy increased employment volatility by four and two times, respectively, over the periods 1945-
70 and 1970-2003. They attribute this downward trend in employment volatility to an increasingly
procyclical compensation policy adopted by the state. Horner et al. (2007) model two economies:
one where a social planner aims to maximize welfare with public sector wages and employment, the
other in the absence of a public sector. The authors conclude that, rstly, that the public sector
has an ambiguous eect on overall employment and secondly, that in more turbulent times there
will be higher unemployment in the economy with the public sector. The latter result comes from
individuals being risk averse and therefore crowding into the safer public sector in more uncertain
times. Finally, Gomes (2014) builds a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with search
and matching frictions calibrated to U.S. data and shows that high public sector wages induce too
many unemployed to apply for public sector jobs and raise unemployment. He further argues that
the cyclicality of public sector wage policy has a strong impact on unemployment volatility.3
Closer to this paper are the recent contributions by Albrecht et al. (2015), Gomes (2015) and
Burdett (2011). Both Albrecht et al. (2015) and Gomes (2015) extend, in dierent ways, the
canonical Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model (Pissarides, 2000) to incorporate a public sector.
In Albrecht et al. (2015), workers search randomly across both sectors, the public sector posts
an exogenous number of job vacancies, and has its own wage setting rule. In Gomes (2015),
workers direct their search to a particular sector; the public sector has an exogenous wage, but
3Another related contribution by Michaillat (2014) stands out as something of an exception. Using a New Keyne-
sian model with random job search by the unemployed, Michaillat nds that the \government multiplier", dened as
the additional number of workers hired in the private sector when one public job is created, is positive (in the order
of 5-8%) and countercyclical, suggesting that the public sector tends to stabilize labor market uctuations.
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sets its vacancies to minimize the cost of producing a certain amount of public services, subject to
technology. Both papers have heterogeneity in workers' human capital, which allows comparison of
the impact of various policies across worker categories. Burdett (2011) is closest to us in the sense
that rms post wages rather than bargain over the surplus and, crucially, that workers are allowed
to search on the job. On-the-job search | and the possibility for workers to switch jobs between
sectors | is an essential ingredient of the model as it captures rich and complex aspects of the
competition between sectors over labor services. Moreover, as is understood since at least Burdett
and Mortensen (1998), on-the-job search begets endogenous wage dispersion. However, in Burdett's
model the public sector sets a single wage, leading to the counterfactual prediction that the private
sector's response to competition from the public sector is to post a wage distribution with a hole
in its support. In our model the public sector's policy is to post wages from a distribution. This
assumption, which we further justify in the main text below, allows us to have wage dierences in
the public sector and a continuous private sector wage distribution with connected support. Unlike
the models discussed above we allow for cross-sector dierences in job destruction and job oer
arrival rates. Crucially, this paper is unique in the literature insofar as the parameters of the model
are structurally estimated.
Methodologically, a similar paper to ours is Meghir et al. (2015) who develop an equilibrium
wage posting model to analyze interactions between a formal and informal sector in a developing
country. Here the two sectors vary in the degree of regulatory tightness, the formal sector rms
incurring additional costs to wages in the form of corporation tax, income tax, social security
contributions, severance pay and unemployment insurance. While rms in the informal sector are
not exposed to these labor market regulations they do face the risk of incurring a non-compliance
cost. Similarly to this paper, Meghir et al. estimate their model using indirect inference.4
Our estimated model ts observed distributions of wages and transition rates well. Amongst
4Apart from the dierence in focus, the paper by Meghir et al. (2015) diers from ours in two main respects:
selection of rms into sectors and rm entry. In their model, a xed population of potentially active private sector
rms decide wether to be active at all and, conditional on being active, endogenously select into either the formal
or informal sector. The equilibrium wage oer distributions of both sectors are determined endogenously. In our
model, there is no endogenous selection of rms into a sector and the behavior of the public sector is exogenous.
However, the population and productivity distribution of private sector rms is endogenous, determined by a free
entry condition that holds at all productivity levels (see Subsection 2.3).
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other things, the model captures a positive public premium for low-wage workers, and a zero to
negative one for high-wage workers. Yet, a majority of private sector workers would require a large
pay increase to motivate them to take up a job in the public sector. The attractiveness of private
sector jobs is primarily driven by a faster upward wage mobility (or equivalently higher returns
to experience) in the private sector. For low-wage workers, this dominates the value of higher job
security oered by the public sector.
In order to demonstrate how the modeling approach can be used to assess public sector wage
and employment policies we run simulations that attempt to mimic some of the austerity measures
implemented across Europe after the 2008 recession. The specic policies we consider are: a reduc-
tion in public sector hiring, an increase in public sector layos, and progressive and proportional
cuts to the distribution of wages oered by the public sector. All four policies have similar aggre-
gate eects: increased hiring by the private sector; increased turnover within the private sector;
decrease in public sector employment which is largely compensated by an increase in private sector
employment, summing up to very moderate changes in aggregate unemployment; and nally, a very
small impact on mean wages in both sectors and in the aggregate economy. The main dierence
between those four policies is in their impact on the composition of employment in each sector:
while the rst three policies (decreased public sector hires, increased layos, and across-the-board
wage cut) are close to neutral in terms of employment composition, the fourth one, a wage cut
targeted to high skilled workers, substantially reduces the share of high skilled workers in public
sector employment. While our model oers no way of assessing the full cost of this shift in public
workforce composition, its predictions are still a warning against further cuts in high-skill public
sector wages, starting from a situation where public sector careers are, because of wage compression
in the public sector, already relatively unattractive to high earners.5
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we derive the equilibrium structural
model. Section 3 gives an overview of the data and outlines the estimation protocol. Section 4
presents the estimation results. In Section 5 we use the results obtained to run counterfactual
5As discussed in the nal section of this paper, a similar conclusion is reached, in a somewhat dierent context,
by Gomes (2015).
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policy analysis and in Section 6 we conclude.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic Environment
We consider a model of wage-posting akin to Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Time is continuous
and the economy is in steady state. A xed [0; N ] continuum of risk neutral, ex-ante homogeneous
workers face an endogenous continuum of employers in a frictional labor market. A key aspect of our
approach is that the set of employers comprises a continuum of innitesimally small heterogeneous,
prot-maximizing rms which we interpret as Private Sector employers, that coexist with a single,
non-innitesimal, non-prot maximizing employer which we interpret as the Public Sector. Private-
sector rms behave in the same way as employers in the standard Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
model, while public sector wage oers and labor demand are taken as exogenous. Those modeling
choices, discussed in greater detail below, were made to strike a balance between tractability,
plausibility, and their ability to capture features of the data and economic mechanisms that are
relevant to our objective. Specically, within the class of models allowing for on-the-job search and
cross sector mobility (an essential ingredient of our analysis, as we argued in the Introduction),
we had to make a choice of wage determination mechanism. We opted for wage posting over
alternatives based on individual bargaining because the latter seemed less plausible to us as a
representation of wage setting in the public sector. Ideally, we could have allowed for some degree
of bargaining over private sector wages, but having dierent wage setting mechanisms between the
two sectors would have made the model considerably less tractable and transparent.
Because of the public sector's non-innitesimal size as an employer, changes in public sector
employment policies will have a non-trivial impact on labor market equilibrium, both directly and
through the private sector's response to said changes in policy. The main objective of this paper is
to quantify that impact for various policy changes.
2.2 Workers and Jobs
A worker can be in one of three states, either unemployed or employed in the public or private sector.
Throughout the paper we indicate a worker's labor market state using a subscript s 2 fu; p; gg for
6
unemployment, employment in the private sector and employment in the public sector, respectively.
The steady-state numbers of workers in each employment state are denoted as Nu, Ng and Np.
A job is fully characterized by a constant wage w and the sector it is attached to. Workers
receive job oers at a Poisson rate that depends on the worker's state. Jobs are not indenite and
also face a Poisson destruction shock. The notation used to describe all those shocks is largely
consistent with the previous literature,  being used to denote job destruction shocks,  job oer
arrival rates and  retirement shocks. To explain the two states between which the particular
worker transits a two letter index is used. The rst letter designates the sector of origin and the
second the sector of destination. So for example, pg is the arrival rate of public-sector oers to
private sector employees, ug is the arrival rate of public-sector oers to unemployed workers, and
so on. As job destruction always results in the worker becoming unemployed, a single index is
used to specify the job destruction shock, p or g. The retirement shock  is independent of a
worker's labor market state and therefore requires no index. After retirement a worker exits the
labor market indenitely and is replaced by another worker who enters into unemployment.
To summarize, a worker employed in sector s 2 fp; gg faces four random shocks: a retirement
shock , and it is assumed that retirement is of no value to the worker;6 a job destruction shock s,
after which the worker becomes unemployed and gets ow utility b; a within sector job oer ss; and
a cross-sector job oer ss0 . While the arrival rates from the public sector are exogenous, arrival
rates from the private sector and the associated acceptance decisions are determined endogenously.
As in Burdett and Mortensen (1998), a job oer from the private sector consists of a draw
from a wage oer distribution Fp () which results from uncoordinated wage posting by the set of
innitesimally small private employers, each maximizing its prot taking as given the strategies of
other rms and that of the public sector. Fp () will be determined endogenously in equilibrium.
By contrast, a job oer from the public sector consists of a draw from a (continuous) wage oer
distribution Fg () which is taken as an exogenous policy tool. We thus assume from the outset
that the public sector oers jobs at dierent wage levels to observationally similar workers. This
6We acknowledge that the value of retirement is likely to be determined by the current labor market state and a
worker's labor market history. However this introduces employment history as a state variable and would complicate
the model signicantly.
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assumption is both realistic | residual wage dispersion among similar public-sector employees
is observed in the data | and needed to avoid the counterfactual prediction of Burdett (2011)
that equilibrium features a wage distribution with disconnected support.7 Furthermore, it makes
theoretical sense: because of wage dispersion in the private sector, the public sector seeks to hire
workers with dispersed reservation wages.8 As such, whatever objective one chooses to ascribe to
the public sector | this could be cost minimization subject to providing a given amount of public
good, or surplus (\prot") maximization, either at the aggregate level, or locally by dierent
independently managed branches and services that compete with one another. . . In this paper we
choose to remain agnostic on the public sector's objective function |, it will generally be in the
public sector's interest to post dispersed wage oers.9
We nally recognize that public and private sector jobs may dier along other dimensions than
just the wage and the transition parameters. There may be, for example, systematic dierences
in working conditions. Also workers may enjoy a utility surplus (`public service glow') or suer a
utility loss (`public service stigma') from working in the public sector. In order to capture those
unobserved dierences in a parsimonious way, we assume that the ow utility that workers derive
from working in sector s 2 fp; gg for a wage of w is equal to w + as, where as is a sector-specic
`amenity'. Finally, and without further loss of generality, we normalize ap to zero, so that ag
reects the relative utility surplus (or loss) from working in the public sector. This utility surplus
is assumed to be the same for all workers.
7In Burdett's model, the overall (public + private) wage oer distribution has an atom at the unique public sector
wage, say w?g . Moreover, private rms are homogeneous, hence achieve equal prots in equilibrium. Now, if a private
rm posted a wage w?g   ", it would make the same prot per worker as a private rm posting a wage w?g + ", but
lose a mass of workers to the public sector compared to the private rm posting w?g + ", resulting in discretely lower
prots going to the rm posting w?g   ". Therefore, there can be no equilibrium with private rms posting wages
arbitrarily close to but below w?g , hence the hole in the oer distribution.
8Burdett (2011) characterizes the optimal public sector wage under the assumption that it posts a single wage, but
does not explore the case where the public sector is allowed to post a distribution of wages.
9The specic conditions under which this will be the case are dicult to characterize in general and depend not
only on the public sector's objective function, but also on the shape of the distribution of wages in the private sector.
Yet it is possible to construct simple examples (available upon request) where the public sector optimally posts
dispersed wages.
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2.2.1 Worker Values and Reservation Wages
An individual's utility is given by the present discounted sum of future wages. For a given worker,
the transitional parameters will be unchanged if he moves job within a sector. The acceptance
decision for an oer within the worker's current sector is therefore entirely determined by the
worker's current wage and the new wage being oered. If the new oer, x, is higher than the
worker's current wage, w, he will accept and otherwise reject. However, since a change in sector
is not only associated with a dierent wage but also with a change in transitional parameters, the
acceptance decision is not so trivial when the job oer is from another sector. Thus depending on
the two sets of transition parameters, an individual may accept a job oer from a dierent sector
with a wage cut, or conversely, require a higher wage in order to accept. These acceptance decisions
can be characterized by a set of reservation wages. With the three states we have dened, there
will be four corresponding reservation wages, which we dene using the same double-index system
as for transition parameters: Rup, Rug, Rpg (w) and Rgp (w).
When employed, a worker's reservation wage will be a function of their current wage. The
reservation wage applying to private (public) sector oers made to a public (private) sector worker
earning w makes said worker indierent between his current present value and the present value of
private (public) sector employment at his reservation wage. Formally, that isWp (Rgp (w)) =Wg (w)
and Wg (Rpg (w)) =Wp (w), where Wp (w) and Wg (w) are the values of working in the private and
public sectors at wage w. It follows from those denitions that the two reservation wages described
are reciprocal of each other:
Rpg (Rgp (w)) = w: (1)
The reservation wage of an unemployed worker receiving an oer from the public (private)
sector is the wage at which they are indierent between unemployment and the public (private)
sector. Formally, the two reservation wages solve the equality, U = Wp (Rup) = Wg (Rug), where
U is the present value of a worker in unemployment. Hence applying (1) to this equality one can
derive a second property of the reservation wages:
Rpg (Rup) = Rug: (2)
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Note that the analogous property for Rgp () also holds.
2.2.2 Bellman Equations
The value function for an unemployed worker is dened by the following Bellman equation, where
r is the rate of time preference and the eective discount rate (r + ) is constant across workers:
(r + )U = b+ up
Z +1
Rup
[Wp (x)  U ] dFp (x) + ug
Z +1
Rug
[Wg (x)  U ] dFg (x) ; (3)
The rst term, b is the ow utility an individual gets from being in unemployment. Oers arrive
from the public (private) sector at a rate of ug (up). Wage oers, x are drawn from the private
sector from an endogenous distribution, Fp (w), which will be derived from the rm side later. An
unemployed worker will accept the job oer if the wage is higher than the worker's reservation wage
for that sector, the lower bound of the integral. Inside the integral is the gain the worker makes
from switching from unemployment to private sector employment at wage w. The nal term is
the public sector analogue to the second. The theoretical dierence between the two is that the
distribution from which public-sector job oers are drawn is an exogenous policy parameter of the
model.
Similar value functions dene a worker employed in the private and public sectors. Below is the
example for a private sector employee:
(r + )Wp (w) = w + p [U  Wp (w)]
+ pp
Z +1
w
[Wp (x) Wp (w)] dFp (x) + pg
Z +1
Rpg(w)
[Wg (x) Wp (w)] dFg (x) (4)
A worker employed in the private sector and earning a wage w has a discounted value from em-
ployment given by the right hand side of (4). The rst term w is the instantaneous wage paid in
the current private sector rm. The next term, is the loss of value an individual would get if he
were to transit into unemployment [U  Wp (w)] multiplied by the ow probability of such an event
occurring, the private sector job destruction rate, p. At rate pp the worker receives an oer from
another private sector rm, where the oer is drawn from the distribution Fp (x). If this oer is
greater than his current wage w he will accept, hence the lower bound of the integral. Given the
oer is received and meets his acceptance criterion, the individual will make a gain in value given
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by [Wp (x) Wp (w)]. The next term represents the equivalent, except for oers from the public
sector. Thus the wage is drawn from a dierent distribution and the acceptance criteria, the lower
bound of the integral, is instead Rpg (w). An analogous Bellman equation denes the value function
for a worker in the public sector:
(r + )Wg (w) = w + ag + g [U  Wg (w)]
+ gp
Z +1
Rgp(w)
[Wp (x) Wg (w)] dFp (x) + gg
Z +1
w
[Wg (x) Wg (w)] dFg (x) : (5)
Note the presence of the additional ow utility term ag, the `public-sector amenity' discussed above.
The value functions given by (3), (4) and (5) allow us to obtain the reservation wage required
to leave the private for the public sector and vice-versa as a function of the transition parameters.
This is done using the identity Wp (Rpg (w)) = Wg (w) and Wg (Rgp (w)) = Wp (w) and assuming
dierentiability of the value functions. This manipulation is performed in Appendix A and the
solution for a private sector worker's reservation wage from the public sector solves the following
non-linear ODE:10
R0pg (w) =
r + + g + gpF p (w) + ggF g (Rpg (w))
r + + p + ppF p (w) + pgF g (Rpg (w))
; (6)
with initial condition Rpg (Rup) = Rug. It should be noted that Rup and Rug themselves depend
on the functions Rpg () and Rgp () as they are obtained by solving Ws (Rus) = U for s = p or g.
However, they also depend on unemployment income ows (the bs), which are free parameters, so
those reservation wages can themselves be estimated as free parameters.
2.2.3 Flow-Balance Equations and Worker Stocks
The economy being in steady-state, the ows in and out of any given sector, for each class of
workers, are equal. Applying this to unemployment, one obtains:
(up + ug)Nu = pNp + gNg +  (Np +Ng) (7)
The left hand side of (7) is the rate at which workers leave unemployment toward the two sectors
of employment. This occurs when a worker receives a job oer from a given employment sector and
10Here and throughout the rest of the paper, a bar over a c.d.f. denotes the survivor function, so for example
F p () := 1  Fp ().
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the associated wage oer is higher than his appropriate reservation wage. Assuming homogeneous
workers, there is no reason why a rm would oer wages below a worker's reservation wage (and if it
did, it would employ no worker and therefore become irrelevant to market equilibrium). Therefore
we assume without (further) loss of generality that Fp (Rup) and Fg (Rug) are equal to zero. The
right hand side is the unemployment inow, which consists of workers being hit by job destruction
shocks in their sector of employment, plus employed workers being hit by retirement shock, who
are leaving the labor force and immediately replaced one-for-one by a worker in unemployment. A
worker can only be in one of three states, u, p or g so: Nu +Np +Ng = N , where N is the total
population of workers, a given number.
Equation (8) is the ow-balance equation for private sector workers, equating the ow into the
private sector below a wage w to the ow out, thus imposing that not only is the share of private
sector workers constant in the steady state, but so is the distribution of wages amongst them. The
left hand side is the ow out of private employment. NpGp(w) is the number of private sector
workers earning less than a wage w. They exit the labor force at a rate  and to unemployment
through job destruction shocks p. The second and third terms are the exit rates into the public
sector and higher paid private sector jobs, respectively, upon receiving a job oer (pg and pp).
The right hand side is the ow into private sector employment, the rst term being the ow from
unemployment and the second, from the public sector.
Np(+ p)Gp (w) +Nppg
Z w
Rup
F g (Rpg (x)) dGp (x) +NpppF p (w)Gp (w)
= NuupFp (w) +Nggp
Z Rpg(w)
Rug
[Fp (w)  Fp (Rgp (x))] dGg (x) (8)
Rearranging equation (8) and dierentiating with respect to the wage rate, w, one obtains:
d
dw

+ p + ppF p (w)

NpGp (w)
	
+Npgp (w)pgF g (Rpg (w))
 NggpGg (Rpg (w)) fp (w) = Nuupfp (w) : (9)
This would be a fairly straightforward ODE inGp (w) if it was not for the term featuringGg (Rpg (w)).
This term can be derived by manipulation of the ow balance equation for public sector workers
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earning less than Rpg(w) (instead of w). This manipulation is performed in Appendix A. Plugging
this solution into (9), we obtain an ODE that denes Gp (w).
An additional hurdle at this point is the determination of Np and Ng (with Nu = N Np Ng).
Those numbers are needed to solve for Gp () in the ODE resulting from the combination of (9) and
the isolation of NgGp (Rpg(w)), given in the appendix. Now, Np and Ng are jointly dened by the
balance of ows in and out of employment (7), and the ow balance in and out of, say, the private
sector, which is given by evaluating the ow-balance equation of private sector workers, equation
(8) at w ! +1:
Np(+ p) +Nppg
Z +1
Rup
F g (Rpg (x)) dGp (x)
= Nggp
Z +1
Rug
F p (Rgp (x)) dGg (x) +NuupF p (Rup) (10)
The distribution, Gg (), can be derived using the identity Rpg (Rgp (w)) = w applied to the deriva-
tion of Gp (Rpg(w)) in the appendix. The latter equation involves Gp (), which in turn depends
on Np and Ng, so that those three objects have to be solved for simultaneously. This will be done
using an iterative procedure.
2.3 Private Sector Firms
There exists a continuum of private sector rms, the mass and productivity prole of which are de-
termined by a free entry condition. Firms are prot maximizers and select into their heterogeneous
level of productivity, y 2 [ymin; ymax] upon entry, as will be described momentarily. Firms set their
wage w and their search eort (number of vacancies or job adverts) in order to make a number of
hires h. The pair (w; h) is chosen so as to maximize steady-state prot ow. A private sector rm
choosing to pay w experiences a quit rate of (w) of its employees, where:
(w) = + p + ppF p(w) + pgF g(Rpg(w))
As a consequence, the steady-state size of this rm is `(w; h):
`(w; h) =
h
(w)
(11)
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If this rm has productivity y, its steady-state prot ow is:
(w; h; y) = (y   w) `(w; h)  c(h)  (y) = (y   w) h
(w)
  c(h)  (y) (12)
where c(h) is the cost incurred by the rm to make h hires and (y) is a xed ow production
cost. It is assumed that both c() and () are strictly increasing functions and that c() is strictly
convex.11 Because of free entry, rms continue to enter until prot opportunities from doing so are
exhausted, so that in equilibrium (w; h; y) = 0 for all rms. The measure of rms at productivity
level y and below, determined by this free entry condition, is denoted as  (y). Optimal wage and
search policies w? (y) and h? (y) can be characterized using the following rst-order conditions:
y = w?   (w
?)
0 (w?)
(13)
c0 (h?) =
 1
0 (w?)
(14)
The proportion of all oers that are accepted from a private sector rm oering a wage w is
 (w).
(w) =
upNu + ppNpGp(w) + gpNgGg (Rpg(w))
upNu + ppNp + gpNg
It follows that the total number of contacts in the economy is the number of hires divided by the
acceptance rate:
M =
Z ymax
ymin
h? (y)
 (w? (y))
d (y); (15)
and that the fraction of these contacts that is attached to a wage lower than a given w, in other
words the probability that a wage oer is less than w can be written in the two following manners
(the left and right hand sides of equation (16)):
Fp(w) =
1
M
Z ~y
ymin
h? (y)
 (w? (y))
d (y); (16)
where ~y is such that w? (~y) = w.12
11We think of c(h) as a training cost. This diers slightly from the standard specication in the literature, which
conventionally models recruitment costs as a vacancy posting cost (although there are increasingly many exceptions
to this tradition). We adopt this training cost specication both for the algebraic simplicity it aords, and because
of the presumption that training, rather than vacancy posting costs make up the bulk of overall hiring costs.
12This argument assumes that y 7! w? (y) is an increasing function. This holds by standard comparative static
arguments, given that the rm's objective function as increasing dierences: equation (12) implies that 00yh > 0,
00yw > 0, and 
00
wh = 0 at the rm's optimum.
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Similarly, the fraction of employees earning a wage less than w? (y) do so because they are
employed by rms with a productivity lower than y. Thus:
H [` (w? (y) ; h? (y))] = Gp [w
? (y)] ; (17)
where H() is the distribution of rm sizes among employed workers.
We are now in a position to close the model given public sector policy choices and endogenize
private sector job oer arrival rates. To this end, we need to make one nal assumption | that
the relative search intensities of workers in the three labor market states, i.e. unemployment,
employment in the private sector and employment in the public sector are constant. These will be
denoted sup (normalized to 1 without loss of generality), spp and sgp respectively. The arrival rates
of private sector oers hence have the following expressions:
up = p pp = spp  p gp = sgp  p:
The private sector job oer arrival rate p (per search eciency unit) can then be recovered from
the following and equation (15), for a given distribution of productivity amongst rms  (y):
M = p (Nu + sppNp + sgpNg) : (18)
This and equation (16) illustrate the private sector rms' response to changes in public sector
policy in terms of search eort (or number of oers) and wage oer distribution. Those equations
determine p and Fp() respectively, given public sector hiring policy, embodied in the fug; pg; ggg
rates, wage oer policy, embodied in the distribution Fg() and \job security" policy, embodied in
the public sector layo rate g. Note however that we do not consider any response of the private
sector in terms of its layo rate p.
3 Data and Estimation
We now outline our estimation protocol, which is based on minimum-distance matching of certain
descriptive moments of the data.13 We set the discount rate r ex-ante at 0.004 (where one unit of
time is a month), implying an annual rate of approximately 5%. The Poisson retirement rate is set
13For a comprehensive overview of related simulation-based methods, see Gourieroux et al. (1993).
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at 0.002, meaning the average working life is 40 years. , given below is the exogenous parameter
vector which we intend to estimate:
 = [b; ag; p; g; up; ug; pp; pg; gp; gg; Fp(); Fg(); (); c(); ()]
Note that the two oer distributions (Fp and Fg), the distribution of rm types ( ), the hiring cost
function c() and the xed production cost () all feature in the list of parameters. As will become
clear below, those distributions and cost functions are non-parametrically identied. However, for
numerical tractability, we will make parametric assumptions on Fp and Fg as outlined later.
The rest of this section focuses on obtaining estimates for the vector . We begin by describing
the moments we match and how we obtain them from the data, and we then describe in detail the
estimation procedure. Results are presented in the next section.
3.1 The Sample
The data used in the analysis are taken from the BHPS, a longitudinal data set of British house-
holds. Data were rst collected in 1991 and the households selected were determined by an equal
probability sampling mechanism.14 Since then, there have been 18 further waves, collected annu-
ally. The model outlined is derived under a steady state assumption. Therefore it is necessary that
the time period used is short and has approximately constant shares in each of the three states
across time. We choose data from 2004 to 2008 to satisfy this assumption, allowing long enough
time after the Conservatives' drive toward privatization in the 80s and 90s but before the Great
Recession of 2008.
Using retrospective accounts of employment history we construct a panel dataset of respondents
at a monthly frequency. We include in our data those who across our panel reach at least 25 years of
age and don't exceed 60. Wages are CPI-adjusted and we trim the wage distributions in each sector,
treating data as missing if it is below the 1st or above the 99th percentile in either employment
sector. We also exclude individuals with holes in their employment history and once someone
becomes inactive they are from then on excluded. Thus, consistent with our model, an agent can
14From wave 9 the BHPS was extended to include Scotland and Wales and from wave 11, Northern Ireland. All
three regions are over represented in the sample and therefore we weight the data accordingly.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Private Sector Public Sector Unemployment
size of each sector:
all 72.0 % 25.6% 2.4%
Male university graduates 75.1% 23.6% 1.3%
Male < university 84.3% 12.0% 3.8%
Female university graduates 49.5% 49.2% 1.3%
Female < university 67.4% 30.7% 1.9%
mean hourly earnings
all 11.99 12.72 -
Male university graduates 18.52 17.97 -
Male < university 11.76 12.11 -
Female university graduates 13.94 15.21 -
Female < university 8.73 9.70 -
standard deviation of hourly wages:
all 6.91 5.73 -
Male university graduates 10.36 7.96 -
Male < university 5.60 4.54 -
Female university graduates 7.66 5.82 -
Female < university 4.07 3.80 -
be in one of three states, unemployment or employment in the private or public sectors. We dene
private sector employment as anyone who declares themselves as employed in a private sector rm,
non-prot organization or in self-employment and public sector employment as in the civil service,
central or local government, the NHS, higher education, a nationalized industry, the armed forces
or a government training scheme.
The two sectors vary in their composition of workers, particularly in gender and human capital
(see Table 1). We therefore divide our sample into four strata, dened by gender and education.
After stratifying for dierent levels of education we nd that university degree results in the largest
dierence in the employment levels and wage distributions. We provide estimates separately for
four subsamples comprising, respectively, 661 university educated males, 1,568 males without a
university education, 649 university educated females, and 1,564 females without a university edu-
cation, all of whom we follow for a maximum of 5 years. There is some attrition which we assume
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Table 2: Job mobility within and between sectors
University Educated Men: Private Sector Public Sector Unemployment
Private Sector 0.0125 0.0011 0.0022
Public Sector 0.0033 0.0089 0.0011
Unemployment 0.1541 0.0302 |
Less than University Men: Private Sector Public Sector Unemployment
Private Sector 0.0123 0.0003 0.0037
Public Sector 0.0030 0.0068 0.0019
Unemployment 0.0882 0.0076 |
University Educated Women: Private Sector Public Sector Unemployment
Private Sector 0.0138 0.0021 0.0029
Public Sector 0.0024 0.0078 0.0007
Unemployment 0.1102 0.0424 |
Less than University Women: Private Sector Public Sector Unemployment
Private Sector 0.0115 0.0017 0.0025
Public Sector 0.0026 0.0063 0.0012
Unemployment 0.1072 0.0308 |
Note: Transition rates are monthly. Rows do not add up to one. The two entries on the main
diagonal are the fractions of workers changing jobs within the private and the public sector,
respectively.
to be exogenous. Table 1 shows some basic descriptive statistics. Consistent with the literature
on the public-private sector relationship, we nd the British public sector is better educated, pre-
dominantly female, on average receive higher wages for which there is less dispersion within the
sector. Also, consistent with the gender inequality literature we nd that males earn more than
their female counterparts and their earnings are also more dispersed.
Table 2 conveys information about the extent of job mobility, both within and between sectors.
Counting in each month the number of people making each type of transition and the number in
each state, we construct monthly cross-sector transition matrices. Averaging these across our time
period, we obtain the transition matrix shown in Table 2. A transition within employment is dened
if a worker reports a change of job and begins work in a new establishment, without reporting an
intervening spell of unemployment. To avoid spurious cross sector mobility, for movements across
sectors, we further condition on there also being a change in employer.15
15A large fraction of reported public/private sector changes in the BHPS are not accompanied by a reported change
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Private sector workers are, on the whole, more mobile than public sector workers. The cross
sector dierence in mobility rate is particularly stark for women. Both high skill and low skill
private sector female workers are approximately 50% more likely to change jobs in a given month
than their public sector counterparts. A closer look reveals that private sector workers experience
much more frequent within-sector job changes than their public-sector counterparts. Mobility
between employment sectors, however, is dominated by public sector employees moving to the
private sector, cross-sector mobility in the other direction being a comparatively rare event. The
separation rate into unemployment is signicantly smaller in the public sector than in the private
sector. Finally, perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from Table 2 is that direct, job-
to-job reallocation between employment sectors is substantial: given the transition rates in Table 2
and the various sectors' relative sizes given in Table 1, one can infer that about 20 percent of the
employment inow into the private sector comes from the public sector, and that about 30 percent
of the private sector employment outow goes into the public sector. High skill workers seem to
have the best of both worlds, with higher rates of job movement and lower job destruction.
In addition, we have data on the distribution of rm sizes in the population of employed work-
ers in the private sector. These data are taken from the Inter Departmental Business Register
(IDBR) which contains information on VAT traders and PAYE employers in a statistical register
representing nearly 99% of economic activity. A caveat that applies to this particular data is that
it refers to employers' sizes in terms of all employees' skills combined, whereas our estimations are
carried out on subsets of the data stratied by skills. Given our stylized modeling of the rm as a
single-input constant-returns-to-scale production unit, we shall ignore this issue by assuming that
either the distribution of rms' sizes among employees is the same across skill groups, or that the
optimal number of hires h derived by a rm is shared in constant proportions between the dierent
skill groups.
of employer. We take those as spurious transitions caused by either recall error or misinterpretation of the survey
question. We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this important data issue.
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3.2 Estimation
Identication of the model's parameters  comes from two data sources: observed transitions
between labor market states and observed wage distributions. Data on the distribution of rms'
sizes allow us to retrieve estimates of  (), c() and ().
Observed sector-specic wage distributions are direct empirical counterparts to Gp () and Gg ()
in the model. While neither has a closed-form solution, both can be simulated given parameter
values. In order to map the wage distribution well, we take as moments to be matched 50 quantiles
of each distribution, giving 100 moments in total: fws;jgs=1;2;j=1; ;50.
Turning to transition moments, we match the eight transition rates reported in Table 2. De-
noting these as ss0 where s is the state of origin and s
0 the state of destination, we thus add eight
moments to match: (up; ug; pu; pp; pg; gu; gp; gg). The theoretical counterparts of those
monthly transition rates are given by the probabilities of a certain type of transition occurring
within a one-month period. The theoretical counterparts of pu, pp, pg, gu, gp and gg all have
similar expressions: modelss0 is constructed by taking the probability that an exit from state s = p or
g, given wage w, occurs before one month has elapsed, multiplying it by the conditional probability
of exiting toward s0, given that an exit occurs and given initial wage w, then nally integrating out
w using the relevant initial wage distribution, dGs (w). For example:
modelpp =
Z +1
Rup
ppF p (w)

1  e (+p+ppF p(w)+pgF g(Rpg(w)))1

+ p + ppF p (w) + pgF g (Rpg (w))
dGp (w) ;
where the \1" term in the exponential is there as a reminder that pp is a monthly transition
probability and that all the ow parameters (p, pp, etc.) are monthly. The theoretical transition
rates from unemployment are simpler (as there is no wage to integrate out):
modelup =
up
 
1  e (+up+ug)1
+ up + ug
;
and symmetrically for modelug .
As for the estimation of the function c(h), i.e. the cost of making h hires for a private sector rm,
we will be using the 12 cutos of the distribution of rms' sizes within private sector employment,
denoted fH(`ci )gi=1; ;12, where H() is the cumulative distribution function of rm sizes among
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private sector employees and the `ci 's are the 12 size cutos for which employment sizes are grouped
into in the IDBR. As will be discussed in the next section, the distribution of rm productivities in
the population of rms,  (y), will then be estimated by matching 50 points of the private sector wage
oer distribution corresponding to the observed wage quantiles seen above, fFp (wp;j)gj=1; ;50.
Finally, the xed production cost () is given by the free entry condition (w; h; y) = 0.
3.3 Estimation Procedure
We rst estimate the rst twelve components of  by matching the 108 moments described above,
leaving   () and () out.  () is backed out in a nal step as the underlying private rm produc-
tivity distribution that rationalizes the estimates of Fp () and Fg () obtained in previous steps,
and () is backed out as the production cost that rationalizes the distribution of rm sizes given
free entry, i.e. such that (w; h; y) = 0. We also make the following parametric assumptions about
Fp () and Fg ().16 First we assume that the wages oered to private sector workers follow a gen-
eralized Pareto distribution with scale parameter p 2 (0;1) and shape parameter p 2 ( 1;1).
The support of the distribution is adjusted such that the inmum is at Rup and the supremum is
wp which is set equal to the top percentile in the observed wage distribution.
Fp (w) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1 

1 +
p(w Rup)
p
  1
p if w 2 [Rup; wp] \ p 6= 0
1  exp

 w Rupp

if w 2 [Rup; wp] \ p = 0
0 if w < Rup
1 if w > wp;
It then proves convenient to parameterize Fg () as equal to Fp () transformed through the CDF of
a Beta distribution:
Fg
 
Rpg

F 1p (x)

= B(x;g; g); for x 2 [0; 1] (19)
where B(;g; g) is the incomplete regularized beta function with parameters g and g, both
strictly positive. Those parameters determine the shape of the distribution Fg(). Note that the
latter parameterization carries the implicit assumption that the lower support of Fg () is precisely
Rug. This assumption, although not implausible, has no real theoretical justication as the public
16In principle, Fp () and Fg () are non-parametrically identied: we could estimate as many quantiles of Fs() as
we observe for Gs() (s = p; g). We use parametric assumptions for numerical convenience.
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sector is not assumed to be prot maximizing and as such may oer wages that are all strictly
greater than the workers' common reservation wage. Experimenting with richer specications,
allowing for the lower support of Fg () to be strictly above Rug, led to the conclusion that (19) is a
valid approximation. The reservation wages are estimated as the minimum accepted wage in either
sector.17
In order to match the moments described we implement a two-step algorithm. In a rst step,
we use the eight ow parameters (p; g; up; ug; pp; pg; gp; gg) to t the eight transition rates
derived from our model to those observed in the data, conditional on initial guesses about the oer
distributions Fp () and Fg (). This rst, just-identied step produces a perfect t to observed
transition rates. Then, in a second step, conditional on the transition rates obtained from the rst
step, we derive the oer distributions that minimize the distance between the vector of quantiles
of the empirical and theoretical wage distributions Gp () and Gg () (we use equal weights on all
quantiles when computing this distance). The process is repeated until convergence. We nd
that, while admittedly inecient, this iterative two-step protocol performs better a than one-step
procedure in terms of speed of convergence and avoidance of local maxima.
Now turning to the estimation of the last two components of , namely c(h) and  (y), we use
the fact the larger rms pay higher wages, i.e. ` is increasing in w, which is consistent with our
model (see appendix). This and data on H(`ci ) allows us to infer the wage rates w
c
i paid at each
cuto size `ci :
Gp (w
c
i ) = H (`
c
i ) for i = 1;    ; 10 (20)
where `ci = `(w
c
i ; h
c
i ) = ` (w
?(yci ); h
?(yci )). Now, with the pair (`
c
i ; w
c
i ) at the 12 cuto sizes, we are
able to infer both hci and c
0(hci ) at these 12 points thanks to equations (11) and (14):
hci = `
c
i(w
c
i ) and c
0 (hci ) =
 1
0 (wci )
We thereby obtain a non-parametric estimate of the shape of c0() over a set of 12 points, from
which we extrapolate the derivative of the cost function over the whole range of wages. We retrieve
17Since the rst and last percentile of the two wage distributions are trimmed, the minimum wage in each sector
corresponds with the rst percentile of the earnings distribution. When the data is resampled for a bootstrap
procedure this will allow for two sided variation in the reservation wages.
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the cost function itself by integration, assuming c(0) = 0.
All that is left to estimate now are the distribution of productivities in the population of rms,
 (y), and the production cost, (y). Productivity levels are derived from the rst-order condition
(13), which gives us a relationship ~y (w), where ~y is such that w? (~y) = w. The number of hires
h? (y) is estimated by inverting the cost of hire function, equation (14), thus giving us an h? (y).
Manipulation of the expression for the wage oer distribution, equation (16) gives us an expression
for   (~y(w)) (this performed in the appendices). Thus we obtain the  () distribution that matches
50 points of the Fp distribution previously estimated. Finally, the xed production cost () is
obtained at the same set of productivity values directly from the free entry condition (w; h; y) = 0,
which from (12) implies that  (~y(w)) = (y(w)  w)h? (~y(w)) =(~y(w))  c (h? (~y(w))).
4 Results
4.1 Labor Market Transitions
Parameter estimates of the model are given in Table 3,18 of which the top two panels contain all
transition parameters. The unit of time associated with the transition/oer arrival rates is a month.
Again, given our estimates of the rest of the parameter vector, those transition rate values produce
a perfect t to the observed monthly transition rates reported in Table 2.
A striking feature of our parameter estimates is the large on-the-job oer arrival rates for workers
in both sectors. Comparison of our estimates of pp, pg, gp, and gg with the corresponding
monthly transition rates pp, pg, gp, and gg (see Table 2) suggests that in aggregate employed
workers only accept approximately 6 percent of all the oers received. Moreover, employed workers,
regardless of sector, receive oers substantially more frequently than unemployed workers do. Those
results contrast with standard ndings from simpler, one-sector wage-posting model. However, the
same pattern arises in estimates obtained by Meghir et al. (2015) in a dierent two-sector wage
posting model, with a formal and an informal sector estimated on Brazilian data.
18Given in parentheses are the 95% condence intervals. These are obtained by resampling the data, allowing for
repetition and running the estimation protocol outlined previously on repeated redraws of the data. Transition rates
are non-negative by construction across all redraws, so that their distributions across redraws is non-symmetric, as
can be seen in Table 3. We therefore nd displaying condence intervals more informative than standard errors.
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Table 3: Parameter Estimates
Parameters Males Females
University < University University < University
p 0:0022
(0:0016;0:0030)
0:0038
(0:0032;0:0044)
0:0030
(0:0019;0:0041)
0:0025
(0:0020;0:0030)
up 0:1705
(0:1245;0:2339)
0:0928
(0:0761;0:1118)
0:1197
(0:0849;0:1699)
0:1155
(0:0920;0:1437)
pp 0:2416
(0:1477;0:4271)
0:1085
(0:0838;0:1437)
0:2273
(0:1258;0:4957)
0:1423
(0:1037;0:1974)
pg 0:0173
(0:0085;0:0401)
0:0023
(0:0011;0:0059)
0:0716
(0:0243;0:1808)
0:0261
(0:0160;0:0469)
g 0:0011
(0:0005;0:0018)
0:0019
(0:0010;0:0030)
0:0007
(0:0003;0:0012)
0:0012
(0:008;0:0017)
ug 0:0334
(0:0132;0:0576)
0:0080
(0:0041;0:0125)
0:0460
(0:0264;0:0671)
0:0331
(0:0235;0:0444)
gp 0:0765
(0:0365;0:1407)
0:0364
(0:0170;0:0573)
0:0402
(0:0215;0:0949)
0:0398
(0:0253;0:0598)
gg 0:1759
(0:0925;0:3847)
0:0629
(0:0372;0:1204)
0:2611
(0:1164;0:6751)
0:1188
(0:0741;0:2148)
p 1:0198
(0:6738;1:6976)
2:1484
(1:4858;2:5325)
1:5390
(0:7605;0:24045)
1:2003
(0:8055;1:5213)
p 0:3925
(0:2937;0:4592)
0:1034
(0:1000;0:2145)
0:2239
(0:1132;0:3533)
0:1365
(0:1000;0:2336)
g 1:9032
(0:7050;4:1312)
1:4358
(0:3652;3:2602)
0:3366
(0:1000;1:5902)
0:5144
(0:2075;1:1003)
g 1:2259
(1:0620;1:3715)
0:9985
(0:7833;1:2024)
0:9047
(0:7979;1:0655)
0:8389
(0:7578;0:9315)
b 6:7143
(0:2526;10:1513)
3:1939
(1:1248;5:2511)
5:8239
(1:7171;8:3802)
2:8698
(0:9607;4:5116)
a  0:7812
( 2:4541;0:7041)
 0:3257
( 1:2654;0:3808)
 1:2900
( 2:3973; 0:4464)
 0:4568
( 0:9149; 0:1481)
Note: 95% condence intervals are given in the parenthesis.
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4.2 Wages and Worker Values
Table 3 also reports estimates of the wage oer distribution parameters, p, p, g and g, and
an estimate of the ow value of unemployment, b, which depending on sex and skill varies from
about $2.87/hr for low skill women up to around $6.71/hr for high skill men. The values of b are
estimated to imply an unemployed workers' private sector reservation wage Rup of $4.57/hr (high
skill men), $2.72/hr (low skill men), $1.73/hr (high skill women), and $2.27/hr (low skill women),
all taken directly from the data as explained in Subsection 3.3. The corresponding reservation
wages for the public sector are: $5.80/hr (high skill men), $2.53/hr (low skill men), $6.13/hr
(high skill women), and $3.35/hr (low skill women). The fact that Rup and Rug can both be lower
than b, which is unusual in empirical wage posting models, is a consequence of the relative values of
oer arrival rates on- and o-the job: unemployed workers are prepared to sacrice some income to
benet from the more ecient on-the-job search technology. Finally, there is a small public sector
stigma, but it is small relative to wages and is only statistically signicant for women.
We now turn to an analysis of wage distributions. Panels (a) in Figures 1 and Figures 2 show
the model's t to observed cross-section (log-) wage distributions in both sectors of employment.
The t is reasonably good in both sectors. In passing, we note that, as is well documented elsewhere
in the literature, the public-sector wage distribution dominates the private-sector one except in the
top two deciles. There is also markedly less wage dispersion in the public sector.
Panels (b) in Figures 1 and 2 show estimated log-wage oer distributions in both sectors, Fp ()
and Fg (), together with the distributions of accepted log-wage oers, Gp () and Gg (). Both
oer distributions are fairly concentrated, much more so than the corresponding accepted oer
distributions. Indeed the large estimated oer arrival rates imply a large extent of stochastic
dominance of Gs () over Fs () for s = p or g. We also see that the public-sector oer distribution
dominates its private-sector equivalent. However part of that dominance is \undone" by later
reallocation within and between sectors: the dominance of Gg () over Gp () is less marked than
the one of Fg () over Fp (). The main driver here is the rate at which workers receive oers from
the private sector (measured by the sum of pp and gp) which is higher than that at which they
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Figure 1: Wage distributions and reservation wages
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receive public sector oers. This implies quicker upward wage mobility in the private than in the
public sector. As a consequence, the distribution of private sector wages Gp () dominates the
private sector oer distribution Fp () by more than Gg () dominates Fg ().
Panels (c) in Figures 1 and 2 plots Rpg (w), the reservation wage of private-sector employees
presented with oers from the public sector. The dashed line on that graph is the main diagonal and
the vertical lines materialize the deciles of the private-sector wage distribution, Gp (). It appears
on this plot that, for lower wages, Rpg (w) > w, i.e. private sector employees will only accept public
sector employment with an associated wage increase. The likely reason is again that upward wage
mobility is quicker in the private sector. However, as one moves up the distribution, Rpg (w) < w,
as when one earns a higher wage better job security in the public sector, g < p, dominates the
higher mobility rates of the private sector. Note this pattern does not quite follow for low skilled
men where Rpg(w) tracks the 45 degree line fairly tightly. Inspection of this particular panel and
(a) and (b) suggest the two sectors are fairly similar for this stratum.
Finally, our model allows us to examine the public-private sector pay gap. While this pay gap is
conventionally assessed in terms of wages, in our model workers care not only about their wages but
also about future wages, which depend on transition rates and expected future wage progression
patterns that dier between sectors. Following Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007), we thus assess the
public-private pay gap in terms of lifetime values of employment, as well as raw wages. Specically,
panels (d) in Figures 1 and 2 display the public sector premium in terms of wages and lifetime value
across the quantiles of their respective distributions. How the public sector premium, measured by
wages or lifetime value, changes as one moves up the earnings distribution seems to depend on the
skill level of the worker. For university educated men and women the premium shrinks from large
and positive to negative as one moves up the distribution. For those without a university degree
the premium associated with public sector employment seems to be persistent across the whole
distribution. This is broadly consistent with the ndings of Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) who
estimate a descriptive model of wages and job mobility across the public and private sectors, also
on BHPS data, but with a much richer representation of worker heterogeneity and wage dynamics:
they suggest that as one moves up the aggregate earnings distribution the premium by either
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measure declines and can be negative for the highest earners.
Postel-Vinay and Turon further nd (for males) that measuring the premium in terms of wages
rather than lifetime values leads one to overestimate the benet of public sector employment. Our
results dier from theirs on this particular dimension: here, we nd that the premia measured in
lifetime values and in wages are roughly similar across the entire distribution for low-skill men,
low-skill women, and high-skill women, while the lifetime-value premium is larger than the wage
premium for high-skill men.19
5 Counterfactual Policy Analysis
Using the estimated parameters of the structural model we simulate the eects of various changes
in public sector wage and employment policy. While the model allows the simulation of many
possible policies, from a topical perspective, an assessment, by simulations, of the various public
sector austerity measures being enacted across Europe seems to be a sensible subject to pursue.
Before beginning, it is important to make clear that this paper has nothing to say on whether
or not austerity is good economic policy. Rather, conditional on wanting to implement it, this
model can inform policy makers on the likely impact of dierent ways to go about it. Moreover,
our results only concern public spending on the wages of public sector employees. Wages for public
sector workers cost the UK government $174 billion in 2008. This accounts for around 30% of total
expenditure and 50% of non-investment expenditures (ONS, 2009).
Policies we consider are categorized into employment and wage policies. Employment policies
are reducing hiring in the public sector and increasing ring, respectively modeled as changes to g
and sg, where s 2 fu; p; gg. Wage policies are treated as changes to the distribution Fg().
5.1 Counterfactual Policies
Formally, the policies we simulate are represented by equation (21), where new policies are denoted
by a ? and the indicator function equals one if a worker has a university degree. The parameter 
19We suspect that the source of this inconsistency is the way in which this paper attempts to avoid spurious
mobility across sectors. One of the main equalizing forces of lifetime values between the public and private sectors is
cross-sector mobility. By discounting a large fraction of reported cross-sector moves as spurious (see Sub-section 3.1),
we cut average transition rates between sectors by about a half compared to the raw data reported in Postel-Vinay
and Turon (2007).
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is the degree by which the parameters change (see Appendix B for the simulation protocol).
Increase in res: ?g = (1 + ) g
Decrease in hires: ?sg = (1  ) sg where s 2 fu; p; gg
Proportional reduction in wages: w?g = (1  ) wg
Progressive reduction in wages: w?g = (1  ) wg  1fhigh skilledg
(21)
These policies are aimed at approximating the types of policies implemented across Europe dur-
ing the \age of austerity" 20. Specically, the policies documented in (21) are intended to replicate
policies implemented in Italy, UK, Spain and Portugal, respectively. While within each country a
variety of policies have been undertaken, these four countries all adopted dierent principal tactics
in reducing the wage bill of public sector employees. Italy froze all new recruitment; the UK actively
cut public sector jobs; Spain froze public sector pay across the board; Portugal implemented a 5%
pay cut on the higher earners in the public sector. While Portugal did not impose wage cuts only
on those with a university degree, this policy mimics a cut in high wages fairly well as the high
earners in the economy are concentrated in this subgroup. In our data over 60% of the top 10% of
earners have a university degree, compared to less than 30% in the overall population of workers.
It is dicult to compare policies without a clearly dened metric for assessment. For each
policy we compute the savings the public sector makes as a proportion of its initial expenditure.
This savings rate is given by the following formula, where the superscript ? denotes a simulated
policy and si is the share of the total economy comprised in strata i:
21
savings =
X
strata i
si
 
Ng;i
Z 1
Rug;i
wdGg;i(w) N?g;i
Z 1
R?ug;i
wdG?g;i(w)
!
X
strata i
siNg;i
Z 1
Rug;i
wdGg;i(w)
:
Conveniently, for each of the policies, this savings rate is monotonically increasing in . This means
it is possible to plot a variety of labor market outcomes on the degree of savings made, rather than
an arbitrary parameter . This is what is done in all of the remaining gures, where we consider a
20The phrase was coined by Prime Minister David Cameron at the Conservative party forum in Cheltenham, 26th
April 2009.
21This formula is only valid, strictly speaking, for the cases of an increase in public job destruction and of a cut in
public wages. Indeed, a reduction in public hiring is likely associated with extra savings on (unmodeled) hiring costs
| the public-sector counterparts to our private-sector c(h). We should bear this caveat in mind when interpreting
the simulation results.
30
range for the savings rate between 0 and 15% of the initial public sector wage bill. To put things
into perspective, the UK public sector wage bill fell by about 7% (in real terms) between the years
2010-2014, while the share of the public sector in total employment fell by about 10% over that
same period.22
5.2 Private Sector Response
We rst consider how collectively private sector rms respond to the policies described along the
following dimensions: hiring, wages, total employment, and productivity.
5.2.1 Private Sector Hiring
Figure 3 highlights the change in total hires by private sector rms across all policies and strata,
after entry and exit of new private rms has occurred.23 With varying magnitudes, all policies
increase private sector hiring. The policies have greater implication for high skilled men for whom
the public sector constitutes a relatively large share of total employment. For example, the results
on Figure 3 assert that total private sector hires of high skilled men will increase by 8 to 16%
(depending on the particular policy considered) if the government aims for a 10% cut in the public
sector wage bill.
While these numbers may seem high, one should recall that they apply to total (or gross) private
sector hiring, including the poaching of workers from other private sector rms. In other words,
some of this increase in private hiring reects an increase in job-to-job turnover within the private
sector. To gauge the extent to which that is the case, we plot on Figure 4 the policy response of
net hiring by the private sector, i.e. the inow of workers into the private sector that come from
either unemployment or the public sector.24 While net private hiring increases in response to all
four policies considered, the amount by which it does so is comparatively modest: for example,
net hires of high skilled men (the category most aected by all policies) increase by 2.5 to 4.5%
222010 is the year when the UK government changed from Labour, which had been in power since 1997, to a
coalition of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, and marked the beginning of the \age of austerity" in the UK.
23All of the series plotted in this section have been normalized to one at the initial point (i.e. at the equilibrium
predicted by our estimated model, before any new policy is implemented). As such, all these plots should be read as
reporting changes relative to that initial reference point. Also, to keep the gures readable we refrained from plotting
condence bands around the various series plotted in this section. However, to get a sense of precision, in Appendix
C we report standard errors of some predicted statistics at one level of savings on the public sector wage bill (10%).
24Formally, net private sector hires are equal to upNu + gpNg
R +1
Rug
F (Rgp(x)) dGg(x).
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Figure 3: Total private sector hiring
(depending on the particular policy) if the government is to achieve a level of savings of 10%.
This leads us to an important remark. However implemented, the rst-order eect of \austerity"
(dened in the narrow sense of the four dierent policies described in Subsection 5.1) is to reduce
the competitive pressure exerted by the public sector on the private sector. This happens either
because the public sector simply hires less, or because it makes itself less attractive by oering less
durable jobs or lower wages. Private sector rms respond to this reduced competition by opening
more jobs. However, many of those added job openings are taken up by workers who already hold
a private sector job: a perhaps overlooked consequence of those austerity policies is to intensify
job-to-job turnover in the private sector. Our model suggests that this eect is quantitatively
substantial.
Further to the previous remark, it is clear that austerity encourages more private sector rms
to enter the market. For the reasons just explained, all austerity measures reduce the rate at which
workers quit private employment into the public sector, giving instantaneous positive option value
of opening a private rm. This induces entry, until the free entry condition holds again. To assess
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Figure 4: Net private sector hiring
the importance of this margin, we consider the policy responses of gross and net private sector
hiring, this time keeping the population of rms the same as it was before the policy. Those are
plotted on Figures 5 and 6, which parallel Figures 3 and 4, only shutting down entry and exit.
Those \intensive margin" responses are markedly more modest than their counterparts from
Figures 3 and 4.25 This implies that a large share of the increase in private sector hiring following
the implementation of austerity policies comes from the entry of new private sector rms into the
market rather than from the expansion of existing rms. This can be traced back to the convexity
of the estimated hiring cost c(h), which makes it costly for rms to increase their size too much.26
5.2.2 Private Sector Wages
Figure 7 shows the change in the mean wage oered by private sector rms (the mean of Fp())
across all policies and strata. All policies decrease the mean wage oered, the eect being, once
25Note from Figure 6 that net private sector hires can sometimes decline in response to austerity when entry of new
rms is shut down (this is the case for high skilled men in panels b and d of Figure 6). The reason is that the source
population of net private sector hires (the total of Nu unemployed workers and Ng public sector workers) declines by
more than the private sector's net hiring rate increases.
26We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this to us.
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Figure 5: Total private sector hiring (without free entry)
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Figure 6: Net private sector hiring (without free entry)
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Figure 7: Private sector wage oers
again, greatest for university educated men, who under a progressive wage cut aimed at cutting
the public wage bill by 10% see a reduction in the mean wage oered by private rms of about
3%. Therefore, the increase in private sector hires analyzed in the previous subsection comes about
through increases in job openings | or higher recruiting intensity | rather than through more
attractive wage oers.
This decline in wage oers, however, does not necessarily translate into lower average wages
in the private sector. Indeed, the increase in private sector turnover indirectly increases wages as
workers climb the (private-sector) job ladder at a faster rate. This eect will counteract the lower
average wage oered by private rms. The extent to which it does so is measured on Figure 8,
which plots the cross-sectional mean private sector wage (the mean of Gp()) as a function of the
savings achieved by our four policies. Interestingly, the overall impact of those policies on private
sector wages is minimal (depending on stratum and policy the impact can be positive or negative,
but it is always small), implying that the increased speed of job upgrading balances the lower wage
oers almost exactly.
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Figure 8: Private sector mean wage
5.2.3 Private Sector Employment
The private sector's responses to all four austerity policies are to intensify its hiring eort while
oering lower wages. The combined eect of these two responses on total private sector employ-
ment is a priori ambiguous: the increase in private sector hiring tends to increase private sector
employment while the decrease in wages oered tends to decrease employment as fewer workers
will be poached from the public sector and more workers will quit into that sector. This ambiguity
is resolved in Figure 9, which shows total private sector employment, for each separate worker
category and for all four categories combined, as a function of the savings achieved by each of our
four policies.
Clearly, austerity boosts private employment in all cases. The results are most profound for
women, who pre reform are more than twice as likely to be employed by the public sector as their
male counterparts. Once again the progressive wage policy has the largest impact on aected
workers: a 10% cut in the public sector wage bill would increase private sector employment of
university educated women by 12%.
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Figure 9: Private sector employment
5.2.4 Private Sector Productivity
Having established that austerity policies will cause the private sector to employ more workers
in all strata, largely through the entry of new rms into the market, it is natural to ask about
the \quality" (i.e. the productivity) of those newly created private jobs. To address this question,
Figure 10 plots the productivity (y) of the average job sampled by a worker upon receiving a private
sector job oer. It shows a sizable decline in the quality of jobs drawn by most strata, particularly
the university educated males.
Next, cross-sectional average private sector productivity is plotted on Figure 11. As for wages,
the cross-sectional average productivity diers from the mean sampled productivity because of
the gradual selection of workers up the job ladder: although productivity is being drawn from a
distribution with a lower mean, workers are making more frequent draws from said distribution after
implementation of policy, which has been shown to boost private sector labor demand. Thus much
of the declines seen in Figure 10 are \undone" in the cross-section. Indeed the majority of strata
see very modest changes in the mean match productivity. Aggregate private sector productivity is
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Figure 10: Mean sampled private sector productivity
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Figure 11: Cross-sectional mean private sector productivity
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barely aected by any of the policies.
5.3 Public Sector Response
We now briey turn to the public sector's response to the four policies considered, focusing, for
brevity's sake, on employment and wages. By design of the policies, the public sector wage bill will
be cut by a given percentage amount. But how do these savings come about? Is it through lower
average wages in the public sector, or through a smaller public sector workforce?
Answers to these questions are given by Figures 12 and 13, which plot, respectively, total
public sector employment and the mean public sector wage for each worker category separately
and for all four categories combined, as a function of the reduction in the public sector wage
bill. All four austerity measures are associated with a sharp fall in public sector employment and a
comparatively small, although still substantial decline in the mean wage of public sector employees.
Inspection of the two gures thus reveals that the bulk of government savings results from a decline
in public sector employment, rather than a decrease in the wage rate. That said, the four policies
all implement cuts in slightly dierent ways; we return to this question below.
5.4 Aggregate Employment Response
We nally combine the model's predictions about public and private sector employment to assess
the response of aggregate (un)employment to the four policies considered in this section. Those are
plotted, again for each separate worker category and for all categories together, on Figure 14.
The sign of the aggregate unemployment rate's response to policy diers between policies:
unemployment increases in response to increased public sector ring, stays constant in response to
a cut in public sector hiring, and declines in response to a at or progressive cut in public sector
wage oers (meaning that the private sector creates more jobs than are being cut in the public
sector under those wage policies). In all cases, however, the magnitude of the change in aggregate
unemployment is small (a few percentage points in either direction).
One policy implication of those small aggregate employment eects is that a government imple-
menting the policies assessed need not worry about large increases in unemployment. Much of the
fall in public sector employment will be soaked up by the private sector. However, Figure 14 also
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Figure 12: Public sector employment
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Figure 13: Public sector mean wage
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Figure 14: Aggregate (un)employment eects
reveals, together with Figures 9 and 12, that the burden of austerity will be distributed unevenly
across worker categories, and may change the composition of employment, both in the public and
in the private sectors. We discuss this issue in the next and nal subsection.
5.5 Taking Stock: Comparing Between Austerity Policies
The previous subsections have established that the four austerity policies considered | increased
public sector job destruction, decreased public sector hires, across-the-board cut in public sector
wages, and targeted cut in the public sector wages of high skilled workers (a.k.a. \progressive"
wage cut) | all have qualitatively similar aggregate impacts: increased hiring by the private
sector, increased turnover within the private sector, decrease in public sector employment which
is largely compensated by an increase in private sector employment, summing up to very small
changes in aggregate unemployment. In all four cases, the impact on private sector mean wages is
small, while the average public sector worker sees their wage cut by 1 to 8%.
Quantitatively, the \increased ring", \decreased hiring", and \at wage cut" policies have
roughly similar impacts (at least if one focuses on wages and employment eects). In particular,
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none of these three policies causes drastic changes in the composition of employment: to a rough
approximation, those three policies shift labor away from the public sector into the private sector
in proportions that are comparable across the four worker categories considered in this paper.
Yet the fourth policy | the \progressive wage cut" | stands out as an exception. The fact that
this policy is targeted to only two out of our four worker categories (high skilled men and women,
which together sum up to about 30% of the total workforce) has an important consequence: the
actual wage cut that needs to be implemented in order to achieve a given level of total savings on
the public sector wage bill is larger under a progressive wage cut than under a at one. As a result,
the impact on aected workers (i.e. high skilled workers) of a progressive wage cut is bigger than
that of a at wage cut that achieves the same overall savings. Therefore, contrary to the other three
policies considered, the progressive wage cut substantially reduces the share of high skilled workers
in the public sector workforce (while increasing that same share in private sector employment).
Absent a public sector production function, the cost of this shift in workforce composition is
impossible to assess quantitatively. Yet it is likely to be costly, as the public sector likely produces
skill-intensive goods and services that have no close substitutes in the private sector. Indeed, Gomes
(2015) estimates, in a somewhat dierent model with an explicit public sector production function
where skilled and unskilled workers are imperfect substitutes, calibrated to the UK economy, that
a cut of more than 6% of high-skill wages in the public sector reduces aggregate welfare.27 The
main reason behind Gomes's nding is that, like in our model, cutting high-skill wages in the public
sector makes it very dicult for the public sector to hire skilled workers, who are an essential input
into government production.
6 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper explores the impact of public sector wage and hiring policy on labor market equilibrium
within an estimated structural model. The rates at which the public sector hires and lays o
27Gomes's model is simpler than ours along certain dimensions (chiey, it does not allow for on-the-job search, so
that the public and private sectors only compete in the recruitment of unemployed workers), but richer in others, such
as the explicit modeling of a public sector production function, and the presence of a government budget constraint.
Incidentally, it is worth noting that Gomes (2015) also predicts that cutting the wages of high skilled public sector
workers will reduce aggregate unemployment, by an amount in the same ballpark as our own prediction.
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workers and the distribution of wages oered by the public sector are exogenous policy tools. The
rates at which workers receive oers from the private sector are endogenous as is the distribution
from which those oers are drawn. The model allows for mobility between and within three labor
market states and the model is estimated using British data.
With this modeling approach, policies relating to wages and employment in the public sector
can be assessed prior to implementation. We apply the model to see what the eects on the British
economy would have been under a variety of policies implemented across Europe aimed at cutting
the wage bill of the public sector. We nd surprisingly little impact on private sector wages and
on aggregate employment. If one cuts public sector wages/employment, the private sector soaks
up the majority of the fall in employment and wages remain relatively stable. Yet some of these
policies have a strong impact on the composition of employment in both sectors. In particular, a
progressive wage cut in the public sector which primarily aects high skilled workers substantially
reduces the share of skilled workers in public sector employment. While our model cannot assess
the cost of this impact on pubic sector production, other contributions suggest that it may be high.
This model can inform policy makers and sits in a small subset of equilibrium search models of
the labor market that are designed with policy primarily in mind. We therefore tried to keep the
model simple, transparent, and \user-friendly" enough, while still capturing the main interactions
between the public and private sectors. As such, our modeling has some limitations. Chief among
those are the lack of explicit modeling of public sector behavior (which makes the model silent about
optimality or the welfare eects of policy), and the maintained assumption of ex-ante homogeneous
workers (while in reality some workers may have qualications that tie them to a particular sector,
thus aecting their mobility between the public and private sectors).28 Future research in this area
should address those limitations.
28A more substantive reason why we maintained the assumption of worker homogeneity (within observable cate-
gories) is that the separate identication of worker and rm heterogeneity without recourse to matched employer-
employee data would rely heavily on the model's structure, and as such its credibility would be subject to question.
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APPENDIX
A Theory: Intermediate Derivations
A.1 Derivation of the Reservation Wage, Equation (6)
The value function for a private sector worker earning a wage w, is given in equation (4). Assuming
dierentiability:
W 0p (w) =

r + + p + ppF p (w) + pgF g (Rpg (w))
 1
(22)
This also gives W 0p (w) by analogy. Integrating by parts in (4) yields:
(r + + p)Wp (w) = w + pU + pp
Z +1
w
W 0p (x)F p (x) dx+ pg
Z +1
Rpg(w)
W 0g (x)F g (x) dx (23)
Plugging the various value functions into the denition of Rpg (w) given in the paper, one obtains
the following, fairly complicated expression:
Rpg (w) =  ag + r + + g
r + + p
w +

r + + g
r + + p
p   g

U
+

r + + g
r + + p
pp   gp
Z +1
w
W 0p (x)F p (x) dx
+

r + + g
r + + p
pg   gg
Z +1
Rpg(w)
W 0g (x)F g (x) dx
Dierentiating yields (6).
A.2 Derivation of the Private-Sector Wage Distribution, Equation (9)
Equation (9) would be a simple ODE if it was not for the term featuring Gg (Rpg (w)). We now
show how to express that term as a function of w and Gp (w). Writing the ow-balance equation
for the public sector yields:

+ g + ggF g (w)
	
NgGg (w) +Nggp
Z w
Rug
F p (Rgp (x)) dGg (x)
 Nppg
Z Rgp(w)
Rup
[Fg (w)  Fg (Rpg (x))] dGp (x) = Nuug [Fg (w)  Fg (Rug)] :
Now applying the latter equation at Rpg (w) (instead of w), we get:

+ g + ggF g (w)
	
NgGg (Rpg (w)) +Nggp
Z Rpg(w)
Rug
F p (Rgp (x)) dGg (x)
 Nppg
Z w
Rup
[Fg (Rpg (w))  Fg (Rpg (x))] dGp (x) = Nuug [Fg (Rpg (w))  Fg (Rug)] : (24)
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Adding (24) to (8):
NpGp (w)

+ p + ppF p (w) + pgF g (Rpg (w))
	
+NgGg (Rpg (w))

+ g + gpF p (w) + ggF g (Rpg (w))
	
= Nuug [Fg (Rpg (w))  Fg (Rug)] +Nuup [Fp (w)  Fp (Rup)] ; (25)
which can be solved for NgGg (Rpg (w)). Plugging the solution into (9), we obtain an ODE dening
Gp (w). Note that by considering w ! +1 in the latter equation, one obtains (7).
A.3 Productivity Distribution
Using a change of variable and assuming the that w? (ymin) = Rup, equation (16) is equivalent to:
Fp(w) =
1
M
Z w
Rup
h (z)
 (z)
 (y (z)) y0 (z) dz (26)
fp(w) =
1
M
h (w)
 (w)
 (y (w)) y0 (w)
d
dw
f  (y (w))g = Mfp (w) (w)
h (w)
  (y (w)) =M
Z w
Rup
 (x)
h (x)
dFp(x)
  (y (w)) =M
Z Fp(w)
0
~ (x)
~h (x)
dx
Where,  (x) = ~ (Fp (x)), h (x) = ~h (Fp (x)) and h (w) = c
0 1

y w
(w)

B Simulation Protocol
Previously the wage oer distribution of the public sector (Fg(w)) was parameterized as a function of
the wage oer distribution of the private sector (Fp(w)), equation (19). As Fp(w) is an endogenous
object it will change with changes to public policy, and we therefore need to x Fg(w) ex-ante.
Taking the point estimates reported in Section 4 we x the distribution derived from the Beta
transform of equation (19).
We implement policy changes as changes to the job oer arrival rates of public sector jobs,
public sector job destruction and the wage oer distribution. Simulating the new equilibrium is
performed using an iterative procedure:
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1. We start with guesses for the values of the parameters (p; p) of the Fp() distribution and of
the private sector job oer arrival rate p. The initial guesses (
0
p; 
0
p ; 
0
p) are the estimated
values of these parameters before the implementation of any policy.
2. The worker side is re-evaluated as before: given current guesses of (p; p; p), equations (6)
through (9) are solved as before, giving us new values of Nu, Np, Ng, Gp(w), Gg(w), Rup,
Rug and Rpg(w).
3. Turning to the rm side, we rst solve the rst-order conditions (13) and (14) for h?(y) and
w?(y), the rms' optimal policies, given current guesses of (p; p; p).
4. Finally, the free entry condition (w; h; y) = 0 is imposed to update the guesses of (p; p; p).
Steps 1{4 are repeated until convergence.
C Standard Errors for the Predicted Impact of Policy
As indicated in the main text (Footnote 23), Table 4 reports the estimated eect of the four
austerity policies considered on our main statistics of interest, together with their standard errors,
given a target level of savings on the public sector wage bill of 10%. The standard errors, given in
parentheses, are computed from repeated simulations based on bootstrapped parameter estimates.
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Table 4: Percentage change in outcome after a 10% cut to the public wage bill
Inc. ring Dec. hiring Flat cut Progr. cut
University Educated Men
Mean public wage  2:47
(1:31)
 7:11
(2:29)
 4:37
(2:75)
 7:95
(3:93)
Mean private wage 0:19
(0:36)
1:33
(0:59)
0:58
(0:67)
0:94
(0:91)
Unemployment Rate 0:28
(1:04)
 2:49
(1:81)
 4:62
(1:51)
 7:98
(3:48)
Private Employment 2:80
(1:00)
3:40
(0:81)
3:32
(0:82)
5:93
(1:47)
Men, < University
Mean public wage  2:32
(0:46)
 0:93
(0:46)
 2:16
(0:50)
|
Mean private wage  0:05
(0:06)
 0:09
(0:08)
 0:02
(0:05)
|
Unemployment Rate 0:63
(0:75)
 0:30
(1:01)
 0:88
(0:81)
|
Private Employment 1:64
(0:41)
1:04
(0:29)
0:82
(0:19)
|
University Educated Women
Mean public wage  0:97
(0:59)
 0:78
(0:52)
 0:68
(0:62)
 1:42
(1:03)
Mean private wage  0:31
(0:33)
 0:26
(0:41)
 0:63
(0:39)
 0:83
(0:80)
Unemployment Rate 2:79
(0:70)
1:22
(1:89)
 1:77
(2:65)
 3:04
(5:80)
Private Employment 4:34
(1:10)
5:62
(1:11)
6:55
(1:46)
12:34
(4:11)
Women, < University
Mean public wage  1:46
(0:28)
 0:48
(0:20)
 1:06
(0:30)
|
Mean private wage  0:05
(0:12)
 0:22
(0:21)
 0:18
(0:30)
|
Unemployment Rate 2:28
(1:16)
 0:25
(2:08)
2:58
(2:34)
|
Private Employment 4:58
(1:39)
4:09
(0:98)
4:61
(1:02)
|
47
References
Albrecht, James, Lucas Navarro, and Susan Vroman, \Public Sector Employment in an
Equilibrium Search and Matching Model," manuscript, Georgetown University 2015.
Algan, Yann, Pierre Cahuc, and Andre Zylberberg, \Public Employment and Labor Market
Performance," Economic Policy, April 2002, 17 (34), 7{66.
Bender, Keith, \The Central Government-Private Sector Wage Dierential," Journal of Eco-
nomic Surveys, 1998, 12 (2), 177{220.
Burdett, Kenneth, \Towards a theory of the labor market with a public sector," Labour Eco-
nomics, 2011.
and Dale T. Mortensen, \Wage Dierentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment," Interna-
tional Economic Review, May 1998, 39 (2), 257{73.
Cribb, Jonathan, Richard Disney, and Luke Sibieta, \The Public Sector Workforce: Past,
Present and Future," IFS Brieng Note BN145, Institute for Fiscal Studies 2014.
Gomes, Pedro, \Optimal Public Sector Wages," forthcoming in The Economic Journal, 2014.
, \Heterogeneity and the Public Sector Wage Policy," Manuscript, Universidad Carlos III de
Madrid 2015.
Gourieroux, Christian, Alain Monfort, and Eric Renault, \Indirect Inference," Journal of
Applied Econometrics, Suppl. De 1993, 8 (S), S85{118.
Horner, Johannes, L. Rachel Ngai, and Claudia Olivetti, \Public Enterprises And Labor
Market Performance," International Economic Review, 05 2007, 48 (2), 363{384.
Meghir, Costas, Renata Narita, and Jean-Marc Robin, \Wages and Informality in Devel-
oping Countries," American Economic Review, 2015, 105 (4), 1509{46.
Michaillat, Pascal, \A Theory of Countercyclical Government Multiplier," American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics, 2014, 6 (1), 190{217.
48
ONS, Oce For National Statistics, \United Kingdom National Accounts," Blue Book,
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/tsdtables1.asp?vlnk=bb. 2009.
Pissarides, Christopher, Equilibrium Unemployment Theory (2nd edition), Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts: MIT Press, 2000.
Postel-Vinay, Fabien and Helene Turon, \The Public Pay Gap in Britain: Small Dierences
That (Don't?) Matter," The Economic Journal, October 2007, 117 (523), 1460{1503.
Quadrini, Vincenzo and Antonella Trigari, \Public Employment and the Business Cycle,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 03 2007, 109 (4), 723{742.
49
